AJEET GURJAR versus THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.3023 OF 2023
Crux of judgement-
The Supreme Court recently held that holding an inquiry in terms of clause (i) of sub-section 1 of Section 19 of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 (for short “JJ Act”) is not an empty formality. The word ‘may’ has been used in the opening part of sub-section 1 of Section 19, the same will have to be read as ‘shall’.
Detailed judgement –
An FIR was registered against the accused persons including the appellant. The appellant was a juvenile at the time when the offence was committed. After conducting a preliminary assessment the Juvenile Justice board transferred the case to the jurisdictional Children’s Court under sub-section (3) of Section 18 of the JJ Act for the trial of the offender as an adult.
An application was made by the appellant before the Children’s Court seeking compliance with the requirements of Subsection 1 of Section 19 read with Sections 6 and 15 of the JJ Act. The Trial Court rejected the application and decided to proceed further.
Being aggrieved by the order of the Trial Court, the appellant invoked the powers of the High Court under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Cr. P.C) but the High Court rejected the petition.
So an appeal is preferred before the Supreme Court regarding non-compliance with the requirement of clause (i) of subsection 1 of Section 19 of JJ Act by the Children’s Court.
The Hon’ble Supreme Court held that the observation of the High Court that the order passed under sub-section (3) of Section 18 has attained finality completely ignores that the order under subsection (3) of Section 18 is not a final adjudication on the question of trying the child as an adult. The reason is that the order under sub-section (3) of Section 18 is based on a preliminary assessment made under Section 15. As such order is based only on a preliminary assessment, the law provides for a further inquiry in terms of subsection (1) of Section 19 by the competent Children’s Court. Hence, the Children’s Court cannot brush aside the requirement of holding an inquiry under the clause (i) of sub-section (1) of Section 19.
There are two parts to sub-section 1 of Section 19. The first part requires the children’s Court to decide whether there is a need for trial of the child as an adult as per the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. Clause (ii) of sub-section 1 of Section 19 is very crucial which indicates that though the word ‘may’ has been used in the opening part of sub-section 1 of Section 19, the same will have to be read as ‘shall’. Clause (ii) provides that after examining whether there is a need for a trial of the child as an adult, if the children’s Court comes to the conclusion that there is no need for the trial of the child as an adult, instead of sending back the matter to the Board, the Court itself is empowered to conduct an inquiry and pass appropriate orders in accordance with provisions of Section 18 of the JJ Act. The trial of a child as an adult and his trial as a juvenile by the Juvenile Justice Board has different consequences.
Hence, by setting aside the impugned orders, the Supreme Court directed the Special Court to comply with the requirement of subsection 1 of Section 19 of the JJ Act.